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Abstract
Outsourcing can be defi ned as the delivery of public services by the private sector. The sign 
of the effect of outsourcing on public spending is ambiguous ex-ante. While outsourcing 
may reduce public spending through higher competition in the private sector, it may also 
increase public spending due to the presence of transaction costs or the so-called “hold-up” 
problem among others. Using a panel of Spanish regions over the 2002-2018 period, this 
paper explores the association between outsourcing and public spending empirically. Spain 
offers an interesting case study from a broad perspective, as the degree of decentralization of 
public health and education is almost complete, and the different regions have adopted quite 
distinct approaches as regards the public-private mix in the provision of these public services. 
In line with previous cross-country evidence [e.g. Alonso et al. (2017); Potrafke (2018)] our 
estimates point to a positive relationship between public spending and outsourcing. The result 
holds when a number of robustness exercises are carried out. By components, we fi nd that 
outsourcing is associated with higher public consumption and health spending, while there is 
no statistical association with investment and education expenditure. In any case, it is worth 
mentioning that the impact of outsourcing on the effi ciency of public spending cannot be 
ascertained with our approach, due to data limitations.
Keywords: Regional public spending, Outsourcing, Fiscal federalism, Public services, 
Regional analysis.
JEL classifi cation: H6, E62, C53.
Resumen
La externalización (o subcontratación) por parte del sector público se puede defi nir como 
la prestación de servicios públicos por parte del sector privado. El signo del efecto de la 
subcontratación en el gasto público es ambiguo ex ante. Por un lado, la subcontratación 
privada de servicios públicos puede reducir el gasto a través de una mayor competencia 
en el sector privado, pero, por otro lado, puede aumentarlo debido a la presencia de costes 
de transacción o al llamado problema de «captura», entre otros. En este artículo se utilizan 
datos de las regiones españolas, durante el período 2002-2018, para explorar la asociación 
entre externalización y gasto público. España ofrece un marco de estudio idóneo desde una 
perspectiva regional, ya que el grado de descentralización de la salud pública y de la educación 
es casi completo, y las diferentes regiones han adoptado enfoques bastante distintos en 
cuanto a la combinación público-privada en la prestación de estos servicios públicos. En 
línea con la evidencia disponible a escala internacional [Alonso et al. (2017), Potrafke (2018)], 
nuestros resultados apuntan a una relación positiva entre el gasto público y la subcontratación. 
Por componentes del gasto, la externalización está asociada a un mayor consumo público 
y gasto en salud, mientras que no existe una asociación estadísticamente signifi cativa al 
gasto en inversión y en educación. En cualquier caso, el análisis del artículo no permite 
identifi car el efecto de la subcontratación sobre la efi ciencia del gasto público, debido a la 
difi cultad para medir la calidad en la provisión de servicios públicos.
Palabras clave: gasto público, externalización, federalismo fi scal, servicios públicos, análisis 
regional.
Códigos JEL: H6, E62, C53.
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1 Introduction
1Throughout the paper we refer to regions or Comunidades Auto´nomas (AC) interchangeably.
2For a review of Spanish regional public spending see Domı´nguez Mart´ınez et al. (2006); Pe´rez Garc´ıa
and Cucarella i Tormo (2016).
3When contracts are complex, the government may need to renegotiate in case unexpected events, not
included in the original contract, take place.
between outsourcing and public spending at the central government level. Also, Potrafke
(2018) explores the effect of outsourcing on public employment across OECD countries,
In the public sector, outsourcing is the “contracting out” of functions that were previously
provided by the public administration under the belief that there are functions which are best
performed by the private sector. Outsourcing in OECD countries increased from 8.5% in 2000
to 10% of GDP in 2011 (OECD, 2011). In the case of Spain, all tiers of the Government
have outsourced partially some of the production of the goods and services they provide.
Indeed, Spain is a good laboratory economy for analyzing public outsourcing across regions
(Comunidades Auto´nomas — henceforth AC)1 because it presents one of the highest levels of
decentralization across developed countries in the areas of public health and public education
(94% and 96% of total public spending on those categories in 2017, respectively, vs. 29%
and 63% in the European Union average). In addition, even though the legal background
is quite similar among AC, they present a significant degree of heterogeneity in outsourcing
levels.2
However, assessing the effectiveness of outsourcing of particular governmental functions
as a fiscally sound tool poses substantial challenges for policy-makers. The sign of the effect
of outsourcing on public spending is ambiguous ex-ante. On the one hand, outsourcing
might reduce public spending for a given level of provision (i.e. increase efficiency) due to
the increase in competition and private sector discipline (Clifton et al., 2006). On the other
hand, outsourcing might increase public spending for a given level of provision (i.e. reduce
efficiency) due to the presence of transaction costs (Williamson, 1999), the so-called “hold-
up” problem (Domberger and Jensen, 1997),3 or the incentives for the private company to
increase prices once the contract is already signed (Jensen and Stonecash, 2005).
As a result, identifying the effect of outsourcing on the evolution of public spending is an
empirical question. However, the empirical literature exploring this issue is relatively scarce.
Alonso et al. (2017) regress the share of public spending over GDP on a country-specific index
of public outsourcing in a sample of European countries, and uncover a positive association
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finding that higher public sector outsourcing is positively correlated with higher growth in
public employment.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between public outsourcing and public spending
across Spanish regions over the 2002-2018 period. Based on similar approaches to those in
Alonso et al. (2017) and Potrafke (2018), we employ two strategies to identify the effect of
outsourcing on public spending. Our first strategy is to control for region-specific factors
affecting both outsourcing and public spending by including region fixed effects. While
fixed effect regressions are not a panacea for omitted variable biases, they are well-suited
if these omitted characteristics are, to a first approximation, time-invariant. The idea of
fixed effects is to move beyond cross-regions correlations and investigate the “within-region
variation”, that is, to ask whether a given region is more likely to increase its spending as it
relies more on outsourcing for providing public services. While the fixed effects estimation
is useful in removing the influence of time-invariant determinants of both outsourcing and
spending, it does not necessarily estimate the causal effect of outsourcing on public spending.
Our second strategy is to use instrumental-variables (IV) regressions to estimate such effect.
In particular, we relax the exogeneity assumption by allowing current spending-to-GDP to
affect future outsourcing levels. In practice, this assumption is accommodated by means
of panel IV estimators using lags as instrumental variables (e.g. Anderson and Hsiao, 1982;
Arellano and Bond, 1991).
Our findings suggest that outsourcing is positively associated to public spending at the
regional government level, which somehow corroborates the cross-country evidence in Alonso
et al. (2017) and Potrafke (2018). In order to gauge the strength of this relationship, a 10
percentage points increase in the outsourcing ratio would be associated to an increase of 4.6
percentage points in spending-to-GDP (84 euros in public spending per capita) according
to our preferred specification. In any event, these numbers should be taken with a grain of
salt due to the endogeneity of both variables that are simultaneously decided by regional
authorities. More importantly, the impact on public spending efficiency cannot be identified
from our approach given the difficulties in accounting for differences in the quality of public
service provision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes outsourcing regulations
in Spain as well as the approach we use to measure outsourcing intensity across regions.
It also reviews the literature on the relationship between outsourcing and public spending.
Section 3 provides some details on the data and discusses the empirical specification together
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Minicucci and Donahue (2004) define public-sector outsourcing as the delivery of public
services by agents others than government employees. Therefore, government outsourcing
is measured as the size of expenditures on goods and services purchased or financed by
central, state and local governments (OECD, 2011). A government may outsource either by
purchasing inputs (goods and services) from the private sector or by hiring a private firm to
directly provide the services to the population.
Governments may interact with the private sector in numerous ways. The most com-
mon practices encompass outsourcing and public-private partnerships (the so-called PPPs).
Blo¨ndal (2005) clearly defines the difference between both concepts as follows: “outsourcing
is the practice whereby governments contract with private sector providers for the provi-
sion of services to government ministries and agencies, or directly to citizens on behalf of
the government”; whereas PPPs “refer to arrangements whereby the private sector finances,
designs, builds, maintains, and operates infrastructure assets traditionally provided by the
public sector.” PPPs are typically related to long-run projects and public investment while
outsourcing is more associated to short-run public spending.
All in all, while we acknowledge the importance of public-private partnerships in determ-
ining overall public spending and efficiency in the long run, this paper focuses on the role of
outsourcing practices.
2.1 Outsourcing measurement
with the identification strategy used in the paper. Section 4 presents our baseline results as
well as some robustness exercises. Finally, some concluding considerations are provided in
Section 5.
2 Outsourcing
The public sector can outsource the delivery of public services in two ways. First, by pur-
chasing goods and services from the non-government sector in order to use them as inputs
(intermediate consumption). For example, the procurement of intermediate products re-
quired for government production such as IT services. Second, by paying a firm to deliver
goods or services directly to the end user (social transfers in kind). For example, medical
treatments refunded by public social security payments (see OECD, 2017).
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OECD (2011) introduces an empirical proxy for outsourcing that can be calculated from
National Accounts and it has been used in the literature (e.g. Alonso et al., 2017; Potrafke,





where P.2 U represents intermediate consumption, D.632 transfers in kind purchased in the
market and P.3 public consumption.4 Although public consumption at the regional level in
Spain is not available, it can be obtained from the public consumption definition:
P.3 = D.1 + P.2 U +D.632 + (D.29U −D.39R) + P.51C − P.1 (2)
where , D.1 is wages and salaries, D.29 U - D.39 R are other net taxes on production,
P.51C refers to the fixed capital consumption and P.1 to sales. All variables are available in
National Accounts, with the exception of fixed capital consumption that is published by the
National Statistics Bureau in the Regional Accounts Statistics.
In the next section we discuss the recent evolution of the outsourcing index in Spain, and
we briefly describe the Spanish legislation regarding outsourcing.
4This data is published by the General Comptroller of the State Administration (IGAE).
5This law transposes the European Directives 2014/23/UE and 2014/24/UE.
2.2 Outsourcing in Spanish regions
The Law 9/2017 on public sector contracts is the current regulation on public outsourcing in
Spain.5 It aims to increase transparency in the public procurement both when buying goods
and services to the private sector, and when outsourcing to a private company the provision
of services for the general public. The law distinguishes between the services contract, the
services concession contract and the public work concession contract. The main difference
between the services contract and the services and public work concession contracts is the
entitlement of the operational risk, being responsible the public administration in the former
and the private company in the latter. Therefore, there are different levels of responsibility
of the Government depending on the type of contract.
Outsourcing differs from privatization on the reversibility of the cession of the entitlement
of the public service provision. Moreover, outsourcing enables governments to enjoy the
benefits from the private management while keeping the control of the quality of the services
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provided and the possibility of recovering the provision of the service. Once the period of
validity of the contract is expired, the company will give back the building and equipment
following the conditions and state required described in the contract.
Spanish outsourcing level has slightly increased in the last fifteen years (up to 41.1% in
2018). Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 1, Spanish outsourcing level is lower than the federal
countries’ of the European Union (Germany, Austria and Belgium) and other large European
countries (France, United Kingdom and Italy). In terms of the structure of outsourcing, the
weight of intermediate consumption on the index varies from a minimum of 34% in the case
of Austria to a maximum of 77% in the case of the UK, being Spain’s 66%.
In this paper, we focus on the outsourcing of Spanish regions because they are responsible
for two key items of the spending bill, health and education, that may be object of a high level
of outsourcing. Moreover, the analysis of the AC behavior enables us to compare between
regions with different levels of outsourcing but similar legal and economic background. The
recent evolution of expenditure over GDP and overall regional outsourcing shows a high
degree of co-movement between both variables, especially from 2011 onwards (see Figure 2).
Among the different ACs, the high level of heterogeneity of outsourcing levels makes them
an interesting case of study. The dispersion on the outsourcing index is significant, despite
the decrease over the past 16 years, as shown in Figure 3.6 Since 2002, 14 AC have increased
their outsourcing level, mainly in the period prior to the crisis. Catalonia has the highest
6The standard deviation has decreased from 5.6 in 2002 to 4.6 in 2018.
level of outsourcing in spite of the decrease experienced through the period. Meanwhile,
most of the AC, with the exception of Galicia and Basque Country, have increased their
level of outsourcing during the 16 years analyzed. The behaviour of the AC changed before
and after the crisis. Before 2007 all but Catalonia increased their outsourcing, whereas after
2007 thirteen AC decreased it (see Figure 3).
2.3 Outsourcing and public spending
From a theoretical perspective, there is no consensus on the expected impact of outsourcing
on public spending. There are two main branches of the literature studying the impact of
outsourcing on public spending.
On the one hand, outsourcing strategies may reduce public spending-to-GDP ratios based
on the increase in service provision efficiency due to competition and private sector discipline
(Clifton et al., 2006). There are different mechanisms for the spending-reducing effect of
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outsourcing. First, outsourcing may reduce public expenditures due to a higher provision
efficiency of the private sector as private firms may innovate more and concentrate in reducing
the production cost (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Second, public sector bureaucrats may
pursue their self-interest whilst neglecting the citizens’ welfare, which would result in lower
efficienty (Niskanen (1971), Onrubia et al. (2019)). Under these circumstances, introducing
market discipline and competition amongst previously protected public service providers
may be efficiency-enhancing and reduce public-spending ratios.
On the other hand, outsourcing may also increase public spending when there are transac-
tion costs (Williamson, 1999), in the presence of the so-called “hold-up” problem (Domberger
and Jensen, 1997),7 or due to the incentives for the private company to increases prices once
the contract is already signed (Jensen and Stonecash, 2005). If the cost of controlling the
provider firm is high or the existence of asymmetric information renders the surveillance of
the public service provision difficult, the firm may have incentives to misbehave and increase
the cost of provision (see Dixit, 2002).
Another possible explanation of the spending expansionary effect of outsourcing is the
7The “hold-up” problem arises when the government needs to renegotiate outsourcing contracts if unex-
pected events occur. While this mechanism plays a more prominent role in infrastructure investments not
analyzed in this paper, it may also operate in outsourcing services with multi-period contracts.
appearance of fiscal illusion related with the source of financing. Governments may use
outsourcing to finance their spending through a source of revenue other than taxes, for
instance fees. Citizens may not associate this payment as an increase in tax burden (Payton
and Kennedy, 2013), reducing the impression of fiscal misbehaving and encouraging a higher
demand of public services. In addition, outsourcing may generate new powerful interest
groups or Lobbies which affect policy decisions. It may also exacerbate the problem of the
so called “revolving doors”8 that may imply the capture of the regulator as it will afterward
became an employee of the public-service concession company (see Blanes i Vidal et al.,
2012).
According to our reading of the literature, there are mechanisms that would rationalize
either a positive or a negative effect of outsourcing on public spending. A first glimpse at
our regional data shows a positive associations between public spending and outsourcing in
all Spanish regions except Catalonia (see figure 4).9
8The movement of public employees into the lobbying industry.
9This observation suggests that some form of economies of scale may play a role. This is so because
Catalonia, the only region showing a negative relation between outsourcing and spending, is the AC with
the highest outsourcing level during the whole sample period.
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Finally, it is worth highlighting two additional considerations absent in our analysis of
the relationship between outsourcing and public spending across Spanish regions. First, the
analysis of efficiency should be better carried out at a more granular level (see Serra Burriel
et al., 2018; Lo´pez-Casasnovas and Balaguer-Puig, 2015). Second, the Spanish public sector
has gone over the past decades through a process of modernization of public services man-
agement practices that has impacted the performance of public services beyond the impact
of outsourcing (see Lo´pez-Casasnovas et al., 2003)
dependent variable is public spending over GDP at the regional level. We also explore the
impact of outsourcing on spending per capita as well as the composition of expenditure:
consumption, investment, health and education spending.
We include as control variables some economic indicators: GDP per capita, growth rate
of real GDP, and the unemployment ratio (all in annual terms as published by the National
Statistics Institute). We include in all specifications the lag of the fiscal target compliance
margin in percentage of GDP, measured as the difference of the annual target and the
budgetary balance outcome.10 The reason for this inclusion is that when an AC does not
comply with the target, it would be required to reduce its deficit in next year. Therefore it
could decide to further reduce its spending.
We have also accounted for the potential role of medical recipes per person in each region.
Since pharmacy spending is included as transfers in kind, it may simultaneously affect the
outsourcing index and overall public spending (regions may prescribe more medicines for
several reasons such as the higher incidence of an specific disease or the political decision to
cover a specific treatment). Some experts consider that the pharmaceutical spending should
10Fiscal targets are only available from 2003 onwards. For 2002 we consider a 0% deficit target. From
2003 to 2007 targets are in national GDP instead of regional GDP. We adjust the target to regional GDP
following Delgado-Te´llez et al. (2017) strategy.
3 Empirical approach
3.1 Dataset
We construct an annual panel database comprising the seventeen Spanish regions (AC) from
2002 to 2018.
In addition to the outsourcing index defined in Section 2.1, we use a set of economic,
demographic and political variables by AC (see Table 1 for summary statistics). The baseline
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not be considered as an outsourced expenditure. Anyhow, our main findings remain robust
when controlling for pharmaceutical expenditures.
We also include two demographic controls: the dependency ratio and the population
density. The dependency ratio is defined as the weigh of the regional population aged from
0 to 16 years and more than 65 years old over the population between 16 and 65 years old.
Whereas the population density of the region is measured as the weight of the population
living in cities bigger than 50,000 inhabitants over the total regional population.
Three political variables are also included in our baseline specification: the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), and the weight of left-wing and regionalist parties. The HHI meas-
ures the government concentration. It is calculated as the sum of the squared weight of each
party’s MPs over the total number of MPs. The left and regionalist parties are included to
account for the ideology in expenditure evolution decisions. The former represents the num-
ber of MPs considered more the percentage of left-wing MPs over the total seats of regional
parliaments, and the latter the percent of regionalist parties’ MPs (parties that only operate
in a given region, and do not form part explicitly or implicitly, of a national party) over the
total number of seats of the regional parliament.
Finally, for evaluating some aspects of the quality of the services provided by the AC
several variables are considered: the ratio of school drop-out , the health valuation and the
health barometer. The ratio of educational drop-out measures the percentage of students
that decide to resume their studies in the age range of 18 to 24 years old.11 The health
valuation is the average perception of the health status of the regions population obtained
via a survey from the National institute of statistics. The health barometer is also obtained
via survey made by the Health Ministry but, in this case, citizens provide their health system
quality perception.12
11Taken from the Labor Force Survey (EPA in Spanish). Unfortunately, PISA scores are not available at
the regional level for the initial years of our sample because regional-level samples in the early vintages were
not representative.
12Baro´metro sanitario published by the Health Ministry: see https://www.mscbs.gob.es/
estadEstudios/estadisticas/BarometroSanitario/home_BS.htm. It measures the degree of satisfaction
of the public health service (scale 1 to 10).
3.2 Econometric specification
Our strategy to identify the impact of outsourcing on public spending closely follows Alonso
et al. (2017). We consider the following empirical specification:
yi,t = γOSi,t + αyi,t−1 + βXi,t + ηi + δt + i,t (3)
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where yit refers to the ratio of public spending to GDP of region i in year t, OSit is the
Outsourcing index defined above, and Xit denotes a k×1 vector of control variables including
unemployment rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, dependency ratio and political variables.
Crucially, as public spending data display strong auto-correlation, it is important to take
account of this in the estimation. We thus include the lagged dependent variable (yi,t−1)
in the regression and discuss below our identification strategy. Finally, δt denotes a set
of year dummies capturing common shocks to all regions such as the economic cycle or
the countrywide austerity measures, and ηi refers to a region-specific effect accounting for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the regional level.
Figure 4 illustrates the crucial role of unobserved heterogeneity in identifying the ef-
fect of outsourcing on public spending at the regional level. The pooled regression line
shows a negative slope suggesting that higher outsourcing levels are associated to lower
spending-to-GDP ratios. However, the fitted regression lines for selected regions depict a
completely different picture: within each region, higher outsourcing levels are associated to
higher spending-to-GDP ratios. While we interpret this positive association as suggestive
evidence, we explore its statistical significance, its magnitude and its causality interpretation
based on our baseline specification in (3).
13In the panel data terminology, partially endogenous regressors are also known as predetermined or weakly
exogenous regressors.
3.2.1 Identification strategy
One possible approach for identifying the effect of outsourcing on spending-to-GDP is based
on estimating equation (3) by OLS under exogeneity. This alternative is based on the
assumption that fiscal authorities ignore developments in public spending when taking the
decision to outsource certain services (i.e. the outsourcing index is exogenous to other
public spending shocks). In order to relax this stringent assumption, one can also assume
that fiscal authorities, when deciding on outsourcing policies in year t, take into account
developments in public spending up to this year but do not anticipate the future, i.e., the
outsourcing index is partially endogenous.13 Under this partially endogenous assumption,
we can make use of past values of the outsourcing index as instruments for the current index.
Alternatively, we might also assume that fiscal authorities also take into account the expected
evolution of spending (i.e. the outsourcing variable is correlated with the full path public
spending). However, identification under this full endogeneity assumption, requires extra
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sources of variation correlated with fiscal policy but fully uncorrelated with GDP, which are
not available to the best of our knowledge. Therefore, we move from the implausible full
exogeneity to the more desirable hypothesis of partially endogenous outsourcing decisions.
Formally, we estimate the model in equation (3) under two alternative identifying as-
sumptions:
E(i,t | yTi , OSTi , XTi , ηi, δt) = 0 (EXOGENEITY) (4)
E(i,t | yt−1i , OSt−1i , XTi , ηi, δt) = 0 (ENDOGENEITY) (5)
where yTi = (yi,1, ..., yi,t, ..., yi,T )
′, OSTi = (OSi,1, ..., OSi,t, ..., OSi,T )
′, yt−1i = (yi,1, ..., yi,t−1)
′,
and OSt−1i = (OSi,1, ..., OSi,t−1)
′.
The key difference between the two alternatives (namely, exogeneity and endogeneity) is
given by the element OSi versus OS
t−1
i in the conditioning set. In the exogeneity case, OSi
indicates that the full sequence of the outsourcing variable for a given region i is independent
of the shocks to public spending to GDP in period t. In contrast, under the endogeneity
assumption, OSt−1i implies that past and contemporaneous outsourcing values are independ-
ent of the current shock to spending-to-GDP while future values are allowed to be affected
by current public spending. Additionally, note that an analogous reasoning applies to the
case of the lagged dependent variable (yi,t−1) which, given the dynamics of the model, is
endogenous by construction. Finally, correlation between the region-specific effects (ηi) and
the regressors (yi,t−1, OSi,t, and Xi,t) is allowed.
3.2.2 Estimation methods
In order to estimate the model under the exogeneity assumption in (4) we make use of a panel
OLS estimator with region-specific effects. On the other hand, in order to accommodate the
endogeneity assumption in (5) several estimators are available in the literature. The most
common approach to handling the presence of fixed effects and endogenous regressors is to
first-difference the data and use the panel IV or GMM estimators suggested in Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The intuition behind both estimators
is based on using lagged levels of the variables as instruments of their first differences.14
14Another alternative is the use of the so-called system-GMM estimator introduced by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that also exploits first differences of the variables as instruments for
the equation in levels. However, this estimator requires the additional assumption of mean stationarity of
the variables, which is not realistic in the case of spending-to-GDP ratios over the 2002-2018 period.
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More concretely, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose to use one lag as instrument, while,
in order to gain efficiency in the estimates, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a particular
combination of all available lags as instruments.
In a panel setting in which neither T is small nor N is large (as it is our case with N = 17
regions and T = 16 years), the proliferation of reduced form coefficients is a concern in the
Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator15 (see Arellano, 2016). All in all, our preferred option
is the panel IV estimator suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) because it only uses one
instrument for each endogenous variable and the number of reduced form coefficients does
not grow with T .
The implementation of the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator consists of a regression
of Δyi,t on Δyi,t−1 and ΔOSi,t using yi,t−2 and OSi,t−2 as instruments. More concretely, the
moment conditions implied by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator —henceforth panel
IV— can be expressed as follows:
15Intuitively, with N = 17 and T = 16, some reduced form equations would be linear projections with 17
observations and T − 1 = 15 regressors.
The validity of the instruments considered in (6) and (7) relies on the validity of the
endogeneity assumption in (5), which can be tested. In particular, assumption (5) implies
lack of autocorrelation in i,t since lagged s are linear combinations of the variables in the
conditioning set. Moreover, if the errors in levels (s) are serially independent, those in first-
differences will exhibit first- but not second- order serial correlation. Therefore, testing for
lack of second-order autocorrelation in Δi,t is equivalent to testing the validity of assumption
(5) and thus the validity of the instruments considered in our panel IV approach. For this
purpose, we will make use of the AR(2) test suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Finally, it is worth highlighting that all standard errors in the paper are fully robust
against arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the region level (i.e., they are








OSi,t−2Δi,t) = 0 (7)
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4 Results
4.1 The role of unobserved heterogeneity
We begin by estimating (3) by pooled OLS without region fixed effects in the first two
columns of Table 2. These include spending-to-GDP as dependent variable and the out-
sourcing index as the regressor of interest. All estimations include as a control the lagged
fiscal target compliance margin, as it may be a relevant variable in determining the expendit-
ure evolution beyond outsourcing.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the negative correlation depicted in Figure 4 while column
(2) add a full set of time dummies to account for cross-section correlations among regions.
Column (3) also includes lagged spending to GDP and the negative association in columns
(1) and (2) is significantly reduced. Moreover, the coefficient on lagged spending is highly
significant and close to 1, which confirms the high persistence of public spending.
The remaining columns of Table 2 present our basic results with region fixed effects
under exogeneity. Column (4) shows that the relationship between outsourcing and public
spending becomes positive and significant once fixed effects are included. Columns (5) and
(6) confirm that this positive association is robust to the inclusion of lagged spending and
a comprehensive set of control variables at the region level including the unemployment
rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, the dependency ratio and political variables.16 For
example, in column (6) of Table 2, the estimate of γ is 0.123 with a standard error of
0.057, which makes it highly significant. In particular, an increase of 10 percentage points
in the outsourcing ratio is associated to an increase in public spending over GDP of around
1.23 percentage points. The implied cumulative effect of outsourcing on public spending is
substantially larger. Since lagged spending has a coefficient of 0.473, the cumulative effect
of a 10 pp. increase in outsourcing is 2.33 pp. because 0.123/(1− 0.473) = 0.233.
16This positive association between outsourcing and spending is also estimated at the country level in
Alonso et al. (2017).
4.2 The role of reverse causality
The estimates in Table 2 show that once we allow for region fixed effects, outsourcing is
positively associated to public spending. However, while the fixed effects estimation is useful
in removing the influence of time-invariant determinants of both outsourcing and public
spending levels, it does not necessarily estimate the causal effect of outsourcing on spending.
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Our second strategy is to use instrumental-variables (IV) regressions to estimate such impact
in Table 3. To be more concrete, the exogeneity assumption is relaxed by using lags as
instruments making use of the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and the Arellano and Bond (1991)
approaches described in section 3.2.2, which implies allowing for feedback effects from public
spending to outsourcing (i.e. reverse causality).
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 consider the full set of instruments in the diff-GMM
framework with and without control variables. While this approach is fully efficient, it
is expected to suffer from overfitting in our setting with small N and relatively large T .
Therefore, we restrict the number of lags used as instruments to 2 in columns (3) and
(4), which suggest that estimates in the first two columns are robust to the concern of
many instruments. Finally, columns (5) and (6) report our preferred specifications based on
Anderson and Hsiao (1982), which exploits one single moment condition for each regressor
so that the concern of overfitting is completely ruled out. The estimate of γ in column (6)
points to a substantial impact of outsourcing on public spending: an increase of 10 pp. in
the outsourcing ratio is expected to increase spending-to-GDP in 2.6 pp. in the short run
and 4.6 pp. in the long run (0.259/(1− 0.443) = 0.46).
Turning to some diagnosis tests, the assumption of no serial correlation in i,t can be
rejected by the AR(2) tests in all specifications, which confirms the validity of our exclusion
restrictions. In addition, the presence of multiple instruments allows us to test for overidenti-
fying restrictions using the so-called Sargan test. In our preferred specification in column
(6), the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected as indicated by the high p-value of the
Sargan test. In columns (1)-(4), it is worth mentioning that low Sargan p-values are not a
source of concern because Sargan-type tests of overidentifying restrictions present extremely
low power in the diff-GMM setting in which neither N is large nor T is short (see Bowsher,
2002).
Finally, Table 4 re-estimate the specifications in Table 3 but considering 3-year periods
rather than annual data. We thus have a small-T setting (T = 6) in which our estimation
strategy is more appropriate. Result are even higher in this case, therefore, we conclude the
panel dimension in the time series is not a reason of concern.
4.3 Efficiency considerations
A crucial element not included in our analysis so far is the possible impact of outsourcing
on the quality of the public services provided. When outsourcing, the public administration
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losses partially the control of the service, and therefore it may be detrimental to its quality.
Private firms maximize profits subject to the restriction of a given price and thus they may
be tempted to decrease the quality of the service (see Hart, 2003).17 In case this mechanism
is also at work, the negative consequences of outsourcing in terms of public sector efficiency
would be even larger that those of spending levels per se.
In Table 5, we revisit our preferred specification but accounting for the quality of the
public services provided. In particular, public spending at the regional level in Spain is
mostly devoted to the provision of education and health services. We therefore include in
the regression three proxies of the quality of those services available at the regional level
over the sample period: the health valuation, the health barometer, and school dropout
rates. Moreover, we include the number of medical recipes per citizen to correct the effect
on spending of the pharmaceutical spending.
According to the estimates in Table 5, our main results remain virtually unaltered when
controlling for the quality of the services provided. Our preferred specification in column (6)
suggests that an increase of 10 pp. in the outsourcing ratio is expected to increase spending-
to-GDP in 3.6 pp. in the short run and 7.3 pp. in the long run (0.358/(1 − 0.507) =
0.73). Among the quality controls included, only the self-perceived health status presents
17Firm behavior depends on the incentive scheme determined by the contract. Whether outsourcing may
be positive or negative for spending efficiency may depend on several factors, for instance: the nature of
the service provided, the know-how accumulated by the public administration, or the level of specialization
needed for a service provision. Firms tend to focus on a service that can provide to different public admin-
istrations, whereas the governments would have to assign a large amount of resources in order to provide
that specific service. Thus, the decision of outsourcing should depend on the characteristics of the service,
taking into account who would be more suitable to provide it.
a significant (and positive) coefficient, which indicates that increases in public spending are
associated to improvements in the health quality of the population. In contrast, changes
in dropouts rates and life expectancy are not significantly related to variations in public
spending. This result might be due to the slow-moving dynamics of these indicators, which
are not well-captured in our annual regressions over 16 years.
Despite this approach is admittedly simple, it shows that for a given level of quality pro-
vision of education and health services at the regional level, higher outsourcing is associated
to increases in public spending. This finding suggests that outsourcing might be efficiency-
reducing: it is associated to increases in the amount of inputs required (public spending) for
a given level of output as measured by health status or school dropouts.
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18This variable has been deflated with the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
4.4 Spanish regional financing system and spending per capita
The Spanish regional financing system includes mechanisms such as The Convergence Funds
or the Guarantee Fund for Public Basic Services with the objective of bringing regions closer
in terms of financing per capita and favouring territorial equity in compliance with Article
158.1 of the Constitution. As a result, public resources received by Spanish regions depend
on their population rather than their GDP. Indeed, financing needs depend on population
adjusted according the financing system. In particular, the population is adjusted taking
into account the cost for the region of providing public services at an homogeneous quality
level across regions. For instance, the adjustment formula takes into account the population
density and the proportion of elderly in the region.
In Table 6, we investigate the effects of outsourcing on per capita public spending instead
of spending-to-GDP ratios.18 For that purpose, we re-estimate our baseline specifications
as in Table 3 but using per capita spending measured in thousand Euros per inhabitant as
the dependent variable. Moreover, we include among the control variables financing system
revenues at homogeneous competences, which exclude all individual competences assumed
beyond the obligatory competences.
According to the estimates of our preferred specification in column (6) of Table 6, the
positive effect of outsourcing on public spending remains when taking those considerations
into account. In particular, an increase of 10 pp. in the outsourcing ratio is expected to
increase spending per capita in 61 euros in the short run and 84 euros in the long run
(0.612/(1− 0.268) = 0.84). This effect is not negligible, as it represents around 5.3% of the
average spending per capita of 3,600 euros across Spanish regions in 2017. When including
the financing system control, results still hold, and the effect is estimated to be even higher,
with a long run effect of 86 euros of an increase in outsourcing of 10 pp.
4.5 Outsourcing and austerity
We analyze the potential role of outsourcing during the 2007-2018 period when the crisis
forced regions to adjust their spending levels in order to comply with public deficit targets
(the so-called austerity). In Table 7, the dependent variable is the change of spending-to-
GDP ratio over these ten years in percentage points. Note that we switch the sign so that we
indeed consider the minus change and thus we can label the dependent variable as austerity:
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Public spending includes public consumption, investment, and transfer payments. On av-
erage, consumption and investment account for 81% of overall public spending in Spanish
regions. In a few words, the acquisition by governments of goods and services for current
19The classification of the functions of public spending (COFOG) was developed by the OECD and it
includes the following main categories: general public services, defense, public order and safety, economic
affairs, environmental protection, housing and community amenities, health, recreation, culture and religion,
education, and social protection.
use is classified as government consumption expenditure while the acquisition of goods and
services intended to create future benefits is classified as government investment (e.g. such
as infrastructure investment or research spending).
On the other hand, regional public spending is highly concentrated in two main ex-
penditures classified by function: health and education. Both accounted for around 62%
of the regional spending in 2017.19 Note that spending by economic function includes both
consumption and investment. Other previous analysis have focused on both education and
health as the sectors more affected by outsourcing (for instance, see Elinder and Jordahl,
2013, for an analysis of Swedish system).
In this section, we deepen our understanding of the interrelations of outsourcing with
the different public spending components. We test two hypotheses: first, whether regions
with higher outsourcing adjust their investment due to cost provision reductions (increases)
the higher the dependent variable the higher the reduction in public spending (i.e. more
austerity). According to all columns in Table 7, those regions with higher outsourcing levels
reduced less their public-spending ratios over the 2007-2018 period. Columns (1)-(4) are
all based on OLS estimates with different sets of controls variables. Note that the lack of
degrees of freedom precludes us from including a large set of control variables as we only
exploit 17 observations in these regressions. Columns (5)-(6) consider an IV approach to
give a causal flavor to our estimates in the spirit of the identification in Table 3. We use
lagged outsourcing (measured in the years 2002-2004) as instrument of current outsourcing.
All in all, outsourcing does not seem to encourage austerity, which might be explained by
the fact that contracts with the private sector are generally fixed-term. This suggest that
even if the government intends to reduce its spending, it may not be possible to terminate
the contract whenever they need to, unless a rescission option is available.
4.6 The role of the different components of public spending
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releasing (reducing) resources for investment; second, whether there are different responses
by public spending function, either health or education.
Table 8 present the estimates of our baseline specification with the different items of public
spending as dependent variables: public consumption, investment, health expenditures and
education expenditures. The main finding is that outsourcing increases consumption and
health expenditure but has no significant impact on investment or education expenditures. In
particular, an increase of 10 pp. in the outsourcing ratio is expected to increase consumption-
to-GDP in 1.85 pp. in the short run and 2.9 pp. in the long run (0.185/(1− 0.356) = 0.29).
The impact is far smaller when focusing on the health expenditure, as the long run impact
represents just 0.46 pp. (0.013/(1− 0.72)).
5 Conclusions
Spanish regional governments outsource to the private sector a large fraction of their public
service provision. In this paper, we analyze the relationship between outsourcing on public
spending across Spanish regions over the 2002-2018 period. According to our estimates,
higher outsourcing is associated to higher public spending, both as a share of GDP and in
per capita terms. This finding is in line with previous literature based on outsourcing a
public sector spending across countries (e.g. Alonso et al., 2017; Potrafke, 2018). In any
event, we acknowledge the limitations of our approach to assess the outsourcing effects on
public spending efficiency given the difficulties in accounting for differences in the quality
of public service provision. We thus leave for future research a comprehensive analysis of
spending efficiency and its interaction with outsourcing policies.
Another promising venue for further research is the possible interactions between pub-
lic and private sectors through outsourcing activities beyond the impact on public sector
outcomes. For instance, di Giovanni et al. (2019) explore how public procurement projects
affect the allocation of capital across firms in the private sector and the resulting impact on
aggregate output and productivity. In particular, di Giovanni et al. (2019) find that firms’
participation in public procurement facilitates their access to bank credit relative to other
firms, and thus the allocative efficiency of the economy.
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Figure 4: Outsourcing and public spending (2002-2018)
SOURCES: The General Comptroller of the State Administration (IGAE) and own calculations
AND=Andalusia, ARA=Aragon, AST=Asturias, BAL=Balear Islands, CAN=Canary Islands,
CANT=Cantabria, CAT=Catalonia, CM=Castile-La Manche, CyL=Castile-Leo´n, EXT=Extremadura,
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Table 1: Summary statistics
VARIABLES Source # obs. mean sd. min. max.
Outsourcing index Own calculation 289 41.21 4.699 30.74 57.17
Spending to GDP IGAE 289 17.28 3.586 9.388 31.29
Fiscal compliance IGAE 289 -0.374 1.052 -6.793 2.660
Investment over GDP IGAE 289 1.657 0.774 0.466 4.058
Public Consumption exp./GDP IGAE 289 12.29 2.771 6.080 21.19
Health exp./GDP IGAE 272 6.025 1.303 3.252 9.965
Education exp./GDP IGAE 272 4.086 0.882 2.247 6.684
GDP per capita INE 289 22,210 4,724 11,567 34,916
GDP growth INE 289 3.464 8.609 -8.739 17.62
Unemployment rate INE 289 15.36 7.156 4.720 36.22
Dependency ratio INE 289 18.30 3.107 12.05 25.41
Population density INE 289 46.68 13.20 24.31 85.15
Gov. concentration Election results 289 0.373 0.0947 0.212 0.598
Left majority Election results 289 44.35 10.16 17.95 62.22
Regional parties seats Election results 289 20.03 23.19 0 74
School dropout INE 272 25.45 8.267 7 43.60
Health valuation INE 255 71.90 4.296 58.16 81.88
Life expectancy INE 289 81.75 1.344 78.38 84.54
Health Barometer MH 289 6.499 0.482 5.154 7.710
Priv./total employment (educ.) INE 238 0.366 0.0908 0.141 0.608
Priv./total employment (health) INE 238 0.530 0.112 0.286 0.950
# of medicines recipes MH 272 19.10 2.392 13.13 25.04
IGAE: General Comptroller of the State Administration
INE: National Statistics Institute
MH: Health Ministry
Abbreviations: exp. (expenditure), gov. (Government), priv. (Private), educ. (education), # obs.
(number of observations), sd. (standard deviation), min. (minimum), max. (maximun).
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Table 2: Public spending and outsourcing — Panel OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outsourcing index -0.279∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.032∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.043) (0.037) (0.016) (0.078) (0.056) (0.057)
Spending (t-1) 0.904∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.055) (0.060)
Constant 28.766∗∗∗ 28.372∗∗∗ 4.608∗∗∗ 7.218∗∗ 4.297∗∗ 3.504
(1.825) (1.638) (0.926) (2.866) (1.842) (5.210)
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289
R-squared 0.13 0.39 0.93 0.76 0.85 0.86
Region FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of idc 17 17 17
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation (3) under exogeneity of the
outsourcing index. Dependent variable is spending-to-GDP ratio. Estimates in columns (1)
and (2) are based on a pooled OLS estimator without region fixed effects, while columns (3)-
(5) report panel OLS estimates with region fixed effects exploiting within-region variation.
In both cases, identification is based on the exogeneity assumption in equation (4). The
sample period is 2002-2018. Deficit target compliance margin is included in all models.
Controls include unemployment rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, dependency ratio,
political variables and pharmaceutical expenditure per capita. We denote significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the region
level are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Public spending and outsourcing — Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outsourcing index 0.164∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.025) (0.031) (0.036) (0.044) (0.082)
Spending (t-1) 0.548∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.040) (0.054) (0.056) (0.082) (0.089)
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289
# regions 17 17 17 17 17 17
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
IV lags All All 2-3 2-3 AHsiao AHsiao
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) test p-value 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation (3) under endogeneity of the
outsourcing index. Dependent variable is spending-to-GDP ratio. Estimates in columns
(1)-(4) are based on a first-differences GMM estimator (diff-GMM), while columns (5)-(6)
report estimates from the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator based on the moment con-
ditions in equations (6) and (7). In both cases, identification is based on the endogeneity
assumption in equation (5). AR(2) test p-value refers to the p-values from Arellano and
Bond (1991) test for the lack of second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors;
under this null hypothesis, the instruments are valid because the errors in levels are not
correlated, as implied by our identifying assumption in equation (5). Sargan test p-value
refers to the p-values from the test of overidentifying restrictions under the null that instru-
ments are valid, i.e. moment conditions hold in the data. The sample period is 2002-2018.
Deficit target compliance margin is included in all models. Controls include unemployment
rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, dependency ratio and political variables. We denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered
at the region level are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: Public spending and outsourcing — Baseline 3-year periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outsourcing index 0.542∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.169) (0.170) (0.182) (0.215) (0.234)
Spending (t-1) 0.186 0.396∗∗ 0.154 0.355∗ 0.220 0.281∗∗
(0.173) (0.183) (0.199) (0.198) (0.163) (0.137)
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 68
# regions 17 17 17 17 17 17
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Estimator diff-GMM diff-GMM diff-GMM diff-GMM AHsiao AHsiao
IV lags All All 2-3 2-3 All All
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
AR(2) test p-value 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.28
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation (3) under endogeneity of the out-
sourcing index at 3-year intervals rather than annual data as in Table 3. Dependent variable is
spending-to-GDP ratio. Estimates in columns (1)-(4) are based on a first-differences GMM es-
timator (diff-GMM), while columns (5)-(6) report estimates from the Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
estimator based on the moment conditions in equations (6) and (7). In both cases, identification is
based on the endogeneity assumption in equation (5). AR(2) test p-value refers to the p-values from
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for the lack of second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced
errors; under this null hypothesis, the instruments are valid because the errors in levels are not
correlated, as implied by our identifying assumption in equation (5). Sargan test p-value refers to
the p-values from the test of overidentifying restrictions under the null that instruments are valid,
i.e. moment conditions hold in the data. The sample period is 2002-2018. Deficit target compli-
ance margin is included in all models. Deficit target compliance margin is included in all models.
Controls include unemployment rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, dependency ratio and political
variables. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard
errors clustered at the region level are reported in parentheses.
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Table 5: Public spending and outsourcing — Efficiency considerations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outsourcing index 0.182∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.063) (0.065) (0.072) (0.071)
Spending (t-1) 0.575∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.054) (0.090) (0.092) (0.133) (0.141)
School dropout -0.021 -0.031 -0.048∗ -0.046 -0.028 -0.032
(0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021)
Health valuation 0.042∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029)
Health Barometer 0.218 0.273 -0.071 0.047 0.099 0.212
(0.223) (0.234) (0.331) (0.337) (0.324) (0.277)
# medicines recipes -0.135∗ -0.097 -0.272∗∗ -0.061 -0.336 -0.186
(0.081) (0.085) (0.119) (0.128) (0.232) (0.228)
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 238
# regions 17 17 17 17 17 17
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Instruments All All 2-3 2-3 AHsiao AHsiao
Sargan test p-value 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.04
AR(2) test p-value 0.25 0.32 0.15 0.25 0.1 0.14
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 3 but including additional controls related to the
quality of education (dropout rate) and health services (life expectancy and health status).
It also includes the number of medicines recipes per capita. It presents the results of
estimating equation (3) under endogeneity of the outsourcing index. Dependent variable
is spending-to-GDP ratio. Estimates in columns (1)-(4) are based on a first-differences
GMM estimator (diff-GMM), while columns (5)-(6) report estimates from the Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) estimator based on the moment conditions in equations (6) and (7). In
both cases, identification is based on the endogeneity assumption in equation (5). AR(2) test
p-value refers to the p-values from Arellano and Bond (1991) test for the lack of second-order
autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors; under this null hypothesis, the instruments are
valid because the errors in levels are not correlated, as implied by our identifying assumption
in equation (5). Sargan test p-value refers to the p-values from the test of overidentifying
restrictions under the null that instruments are valid, i.e. moment conditions hold in the
data. Deficit target compliance margin and number of recipes over regional population are
included in all models. The sample period is 2002-2018. Controls include unemployment
rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, dependency ratio and political variables. We denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered
at the region level are reported in parentheses.
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Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation (3) under endogeneity of the outsourcing
index. Dependent variable is spending-to-GDP ratio. Estimates in columns (1)-(4) are based on a first-
differences GMM estimator (diff-GMM), while columns (5)-(7) report estimates from the Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) estimator based on the moment conditions in equations (6) and (7). In column (7)
we include as control the financing system revenues at homogeneous competencies. In both cases,
identification is based on the endogeneity assumption in equation (5). AR(2) test p-value refers to
the p-values from Arellano and Bond (1991) test for the lack of second-order autocorrelation in the
first-differenced errors; under this null hypothesis, the instruments are valid because the errors in levels
are not correlated, as implied by our identifying assumption in equation (5). Sargan test p-value refers
to the p-values from the test of overidentifying restrictions under the null that instruments are valid,
i.e. moment conditions hold in the data. The sample period is 2002-2018. Deficit target compliance
margin is included in all models.Controls include unemployment rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth,
dependency ratio and political variables. Finally, we also include as a control the proxy for financing
needs at the AC level. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
Standard errors clustered at the region level are reported in parentheses.
Table 6: Public spending and outsourcing — Per capita terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable is per capita public spending
Outsourcing index 0.377∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.612∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.070) (0.078) (0.118) (0.172) (0.325)
Spending (t-1) 0.584∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.039) (0.045) (0.049) (0.079) (0.063) (0.085)
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 210
# regions 17 17 17 17 17 17 15
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES YES
Instruments All All 2-3 2-3 AHsiao AHsiao AHsiao
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) test p-value 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07
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Table 7: Austerity and outsourcing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial outsourcing -0.138*** -0.094** -0.154*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.117**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.038) (0.046)
Spending (t-1) 0.249*** 0.177* 0.176* 0.180
(0.073) (0.096) (0.091) (0.133)
Change outsourcing index -0.222** -0.117 -0.118 -0.119
(0.085) (0.097) (0.093) (0.103)
Constant 6.297*** 0.301 6.736*** 2.283 2.295 2.190
(1.267) (2.130) (1.122) (2.611) (2.524) (3.686)
Observations 17 17 17 17 17 17
R-squared 0.219 0.488 0.442 0.527 0.527 0.527
Period 2007-2017 2007-2017 2007-2017 2007-2017 2007-2017 2007-2017
Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes: Dependent variable is austerity, defined as minus the change in spending-to-GDP over the 2007-2017
period (higher values correspond to more austerity). Initial outsourcing refers to the outsourcing index in
2007. Estimates in columns (1)-(4) are based on OLS, while columns (5)-(6) consider an IV approach in which
outsourcing in 2007 is instrumented with lagged outsourcing. Deficit target compliance margin is included in
all models. Controls include unemployment rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, dependency ratio and political
variables. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
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Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation (3) under endogen-
eity of the outsourcing index. Dependent variables are the different components
of public spending over GDP. All estimates rely on the Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
estimator based on the moment conditions in equations (6) and (7). Identification
is based on the endogeneity assumption in equation (5). AR(2) test p-value refers
to the p-values from Arellano and Bond (1991) test for the lack of second-order
autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors; under this null hypothesis, the in-
struments are valid because the errors in levels are not correlated, as implied
by our identifying assumption in equation (5). Sargan test p-value refers to the
p-values from the test of overidentifying restrictions under the null that instru-
ments are valid, i.e. moment conditions hold in the data. The sample period is
2002-2018. Deficit target compliance margin is included in all models. Controls
include unemployment rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth, dependency ratio and
political variables. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the region level are reported in
parentheses.
Upon request, results considering alternative outsourcing measurements based
on the weight of private employment over total employment in the health and
education sector are available.
Table 8: Impact of outsourcing in the components of public spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Consumption Investment Health Education
Outsourcing index 0.185∗∗∗ -0.005 0.013∗ -0.002
(0.037) (0.015) (0.008) (0.005)
Dependent var. (t-1) 0.356∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗
(0.087) (0.073) (0.159) (0.162)
Observations 289 289 272 272
# regions 17 17 17 17
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Instruments AHsiao AHsiao AHsiao AHsiao
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
AR(2) test p-value 0.35 0.38 0.51 0.91
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